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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The concept of "globalization" has received considerable 
attention in the last several years. Many scholars have 
addressed the economic and political consequences of a world 
that is more interdependent (global). The following pages are 
directly a result of these and other, more informal, 
discussions of the potential results of a world that is more 
interconnected. More specifically, does globalization make 
individuals and societies more alike, more likely to assert 
differences, or have no effect in either direction? Exploring 
this question is the purpose of this thesis. To this end, I 
will divide the following thesis into five sections. First, is 
a general introduction to the concept and study of 
globalization. Second, is a review of the literature relating 
to the theoretical effects of globalization on human values 
and culture. Third, is a discussion of the particular 
methodology used to examine the effects of globalization, . . 
i.e., convergence and divergence. Fourth, is a description of 
the general results of this analysis, some preliminary 
observations, and conclusions. Finally, the theoretical and 
real-world implications of the present study are discussed and 
general conclusions are presented. 
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Globalization: An Introduction 
Globalization means different things for different 
people. As Riggs (1998) notes, globalization may have 
different dimensions depending on whether we examine 
globalization from an economic, political, social, 
psychological, cultural, or geographical realm. Specifically, 
he writes that the dimensions used to define globalization 
will be different depending on the social science discipline 
from which we study. Each of these different dimensions 
includes the concepts necessary for measuring the extent of 
globalization. Table 1 illustrates these different dimensions. 
Table 1. The Several Dimensions of Globalization. 
Social Science Discipline 
Economics 
Political Science 
Sociology 
Psychology 
Anthropology 
Communications 
Geography 
Indicators of Globalization 
trade, money, corporations, 
banking, capital 
governance, war, peace, IGOs, 
NGOs, regimes 
communities, conflict, classes, 
nations, agreements 
individuals as subjects and 
objects of global action 
cultures overlapping, adapting, 
clashing, merging 
information as knowledge and 
tools--the Internet 
everything, provided it can be 
anchored in space 
Source: Riggs, Fred. (1998). "Concepts of Globalization" 
http://www2.hawaii.edu/-fredr/glonotes.htm. p. 2-3. 
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Many scholars have described globalization in these very 
terms. In fact, globalization is often described as the 
interdependence between nations that occurs as the result of 
the mobilization of goods and services, technology, people, 
and information on a global scale. More empirically, this 
mobilization is often measured as the volume and value of 
imports and exports, the transfer of capital, the extent of 
foreign travel, and international communication such as the 
Internet or satellite television (Almond & Powell, 1992). 
Inkeles (1998) also writes that globalization is evident 
in the degree to which nations and individuals are 
interconnected and interdependent. Further, he notes that a 
single, worldwide social system is emerging based upon two 
distinct elements: global trade and global communication 
(p.195). Global communication is defined by Inkeles as the 
"transmission and exchange of information, ideas, techniques, 
art forms, tastes, values, and sentiments" (p. 195). Examples 
of such exchange are the worldwide postal, telephone, radio, 
television, satellite, and computer systems that increasingly 
link individuals and nations. 
In addition, Gundlach & Nunnenkamp (1996) provide strong 
economic indicators of globalization. Like Inkeles, they also 
recognize global trade as an important indicator of 
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globalization. However, they also consider more specific 
economic measures like foreign direct investment and the 
extent of developing countries' share of global trade to be 
important indicators of globalization. Especially relevant to 
this paper is the increase in globalization from the early 
1980s to 1990 summarized in Table 2 below. When adjusted for 
inflation, total global trade has nearly doubled from 1983 to 
1990, while global foreign direct investment has increased by 
greater than 200 percent during the same period. Additionally, 
developing countries' share of global manufacturing trade has 
increased nearly 37 percent, from 13.1 percent of total trade 
Table 2. Economic Indicators of Globalization. 
Year 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Total Global 
Trade 
1983=100 
100.0 
105.8 
106.2 
117.4 
137.8 
157.0 
170.3 
192.3 
Global Foreign 
Direct 
Investment 
1983=100 
100.0 
102.8 
102.8 
125.7 
153.3 
176.6 
188.5 
216.4 
Developing Countries' 
Share in Global Trade 
Manufactures (% of 
Total) 
13.1 
12.7 
12.0 
13.1 
14.7 
15.6 
18.2 
17.9 
Source: Latin American Economic System report "Change and Continuity in the 
International Globalization Process: Turn of the Century Scenarios" 
(SP/CL/XXII.0/Di No.4), 22-25 October 1996. 
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in 1983 to almost 18 percent of the total by 1990. These 
authors conclude this is ample evidence of economic 
globalization. 
Beyond these indicators of globalization, many authors 
suggest that the global flow of information and economic 
interdependence have some impact on social and individual 
attitudes and not just on issues of political or economic 
importance. As noted by Axelrod (1997), "recent advances in 
transportation, mass media, and information technology [make] 
many interactions largely independent of geographical 
distances" (p. 224). Van Der Pijl (1984) calls this global 
interaction: "transnational coalitions of social forces" that 
influence not only· the political and economic structures of 
nations, but also have an impact on basic attitudes toward 
interpersonal relationships and the social structure of 
society. Rodrik (1997) echoes this dynamic impact by stating, 
"nations have legitimate reasons for worrying about what 
globalization does to their norms and social arrangements" (p. 
48). Friedman (1999) contends that globalization is an 
"international system, with its own unique attributes" (p. 1). 
Other authors see globalization not as an international 
system with its own attributes and influences, but as the 
continuation of modernization on a global scale. In his 
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earlier books suggesting the rise of postmodern and 
postmaterialist values, Ronald Inglehart (1977; 1989) defines 
post materialist values as 'higher-order' values such that 
they are the result of the relative security that comes from 
growing up with high levels of economic wealth. In his latest 
book chronicling the transition to these 'higher-order' 
values, Inglehart (1997) states that the root of this shift is 
the "gradual withering away of value systems dependent on 
scarcity" (p. 78). These 'value systems,' or cultures, are 
made up of the underlying attitudes, beliefs, skills, and 
knowledge of the people within a nation. In fact, Inglehart 
argues that postmaterialists are not non-materialists or anti-
materialists (p. 35). Instead, postmaterialist values are 
those values that become important after material economic 
security is achieved (p. 35). Additionally, the achievement 
of economic security has caused these changes in values (p. 
35). Inglehart states that culture usually changes slowly, 
but eventually does respond to changes in its external 
environment. He also argues that culture has an impact on the 
economic conditions of a society. However, he does not 
believe that the change to postmaterialist values can occur 
without the achievement of material security. 
Writing several years earlier, Moore (1979) places a 
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similar emphasis on modernization as the key to changing 
values. He claims that there is no guarantee that societies 
will display similar values without modernization (p. 151) 
This is where globalization and modernization diverge. 
Globalization is expected to have an influence on the values 
and beliefs of individuals who are premodern, modern, and 
postmodern in terms of economic security. In other words, 
while Inglehart does not expect to see postmaterial values 
displayed among nations or individuals who have not achieved 
material security, the effects of globalization are 
independent of the level of economic security. It is the 
interaction of individuals and nations on a global scale that 
influences value change. Thus, we can expect globalization to 
affect global culture. The next section discusses the 
potential influence of globalization in creating a global 
value system. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION 
A Global Value System? 
A second body of literature examines the impact of 
globalization on cultural homogeneity. That is, as 
globalization increases, do nations become more like one 
another, remain equal distances apart, or in response to the 
threat of assimilation become more protective of their own 
culture? According to Inglehart (1997), culture is the system 
of values, attitudes, beliefs, skills, and knowledge of the 
people within a nation. Amin (1997) argues that most social 
or political movements rely on the idea that cultural 
homogenization does occur. It is utterly deterministic (and 
entirely pessimistic) to assume that attitudes cannot be 
changed. Thus, many social movements attempt to change 
attitudes. For example, the socialist movement relied on the 
assumption that capitalism would erase national boundaries and 
that the resulting homogenization of society would lay the 
basis for class struggle and socialism at a world level (Amin, 
1997, p. 85). 
Pye (1966) asserted that for individual nations, 
development in isolation of other nations was impossible. He 
claimed that a world culture exists in styles of dress, music, 
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political, and social systems. Teague & Grahl (1991) suggest 
that there is a general expectation of a uniform transnational 
order that occurs by diffusion through a multinational 
political market. Globalization adds economic and social 
markets to this 'diffusion' into a uniform transnational 
order. 
In addition, Thorns (1992) suggests that while 
nationalist movements illustrate existing heterogeneity within 
nations, economic interdependence and the spread of mass 
culture is pulling the world closer together. Further, Inkeles 
(1998) argues that this interdependence and mass culture 
requires a system of symbols and values that are mutually 
intelligible (pp. 203-204). Through these shared experiences, 
such as movies, television, music, and sporting events, is the 
emergence of a truly universal world culture in which ways of 
interacting with others is homogenized as we identify similar 
patterns of interpersonal relationships, marriage, commerce, 
etc.(p. 227). 
Friedman (1999) argues that globalization is a cultural 
system that tends to be homogenizing. For example, he notes 
that unlike the Cold War system of competing value systems 
(democracy and capitalism versus communism and socialism), the 
globalization system is based on the triumph of free-market 
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capitalism. Thus to exist in this system, nations and 
individuals must adopt the values necessary for capitalism to 
thrive, i.e., free trade, competition, privatization, etc. 
From this perspective, Friedman predicts a more homogenous 
global culture as a result of globalization. 
Or Continuing Diversity? 
On the other hand, many other scholars are still unsure 
of the consequences of globalization on global culture. Amin 
(1989) fears that globalization has taken on an ethnocentric 
composition that believes that the Western model is the best 
way to solve current problems. Similarly, Gill (1997) sees 
globalization as a set of cultural practices and ideological 
understandings that seek universal applicability. He claims 
that globalization may allow more dominant countries the 
opportunity to broaden their cultural practices and lead to 
cultural homogenization on a world scale regardless of whether 
their cultural practices are best suited for other nations. 
Law (1997) provides an example of the arrogance of Western 
culture. He says that many subscribe to the view expressed by 
former President Bush that "our lifestyle is not negotiable" 
(p. 174). If the resolve in non-Western societies is not as 
strong, Law seems to suggest that cultural homogenization will 
occur. 
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Schafer (1996) takes a much more favorable approach to 
cultural homogenization. He claims that the world is becoming 
a much more dehumanized and impersonal place. As a result, he 
says we "need to strive for an 'indivisible' world since 
receiving and assimilating influences from abroad is mandatory 
if cultures are to mature and ripen properly" (p. 294). 
Rodrik (1997) sees free trade among countries with different 
histories as requiring at least some willingness to accept the 
cultural norms of those countries around you. Recently, many 
authors have seen the success of the European Union as 
dependent on the reduction of political, economic, and social 
differences between the nations. Abramson & Inglehart's 
(1995) discussion proposes a trend toward postmaterialist 
values that implies a convergence of attitudes both cross 
nationally and within national boundaries at least as related 
to the economic security derived from modernization. 
Still others are not convinced that globalization has 
either a homogenizing influence or a divergent impact on world 
attitudes. These authors conclude that despite some evidence 
of convergence, there is also strong evidence of divergence. 
For example, Hannerz (1990), Appadurai (1990), and Lull (1995) 
suggest that globalization has an impact on the attitudes of 
individuals, but the various influences (mass media, tourism, 
12 
trade, political organizations) counteract the homogenizing 
influences of each other. The result might be what Axford 
(1995) calls 'virtual globality' whereas citizens may have 
become global consumers, but they still hold on to the 
attitudes or cultural practices with which they are familiar 
(p. 209). 
Axelrod (1997) concludes that homogeneity within a nation 
can lead to global polarization since some regions may develop 
sharing the same culture, but at the same time have nothing in 
common with other regions. However, Axelrod also notes that 
with random long distance interactions (globalization), the 
heterogeneity caused by regional interaction cannot be 
maintained. Thus, he concludes that as the territory of 
interaction gets larger, the effect is a homogenization of 
culture. On the other hand, Resnick, Iacovou, Suchak, 
Bergstrom, and Riedl (1994) and Abramson, Arterton, and Orren 
(1988) suggest that the growth of electronic 'travel' will 
allow people to interact only with those who already hold 
similar beliefs or cultural practices. Axelrod (1997) allows 
for this view when he concludes, "self-selection could result 
in an even stronger tendency toward both 'local' convergence 
and global polarization" (p.224). Thus, globalization may work 
against itself in producing a homogenous world culture. 
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Finally, Fukuyama (1999) argues that while there is some 
evidence of convergence of political and economic ideologies, 
there are deeper elements of culture that will resist 
homogenization. For example, in a global economic system 
there are a fixed number of political and economic systems 
that can ensure global competitiveness (p.l). However, as 
global communication systems allow us to see other cultures, 
we can define more clearly what we believe most valuable in 
our own culture (p.2). Thus, he argues individuals are able 
resist cultural homogeneity when those values conflict with 
what we hold dear. The next section discusses the current 
evidence of convergence or divergence as it relates to various 
elements of the social system. 
Convergence and Divergence: The Evidence So Far 
The preceding discussion leads me to the goals of this 
research. Based on the work of the above authors, it is safe 
to assume that globalization has an impact not only on 
economic and political dimensions, but also on cultural and 
social dimensions. The extent of this impact is the goal of 
this paper. First, given the existence of a global 
socioeconomic system, are nations and individuals becoming 
more similar in their values? If not, are they becoming 
farther apart in these values or are they staying the same 
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distance apart in relative terms? A discussion of the body of 
research relating specifically to these goals will more 
clearly outline my research hypotheses. 
Kerr (1983) identifies six segments of society with 
substantial evidence of similarity: the content of knowledge, 
the mobilization of the resources of production, the 
organization of production, the patterns of work, patterns of 
living, and the patterns of the distribution of economic 
rewards (p. 72). He also notes three areas without significant 
similarity: economic structures, political structures, and 
patterns of belief. 
Alex Inkeles (1998) provides a more detailed summary of 
the research regarding the social system. He describes five 
elements of the social system examined for evidence 
similarities among nations: 1) modes of production and 
patterns of resource use, 2) institutional arrays, forms, and 
processes, 3) structures and patterns of social relationships, 
4) systems of popular attitudes, values, and behaviors, and 5) 
systems of political and economic control. Inkeles argues 
there is significant evidence of similarity among the various 
modes of production and patterns of resource utilization. This 
evidence is in the growing use of inanimate sources of power, 
the increasing reliance on science and technology, such as 
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transistors, computers, vaccinations, b\rth control, 
fertilizers, and bio-technological food sources, etc. (p. 20). 
Further, the growth of electronic communication, scientific 
medicine, rapid transit, and computerized record keeping 
symbolizes the incorporation of people into a technological 
network (p. 20). 
The growing differentiation, specialization, and 
bureaucratization in institutional forms signify growing 
similarity in this second element of the social system 
(Inkeles, 1998, p.21). Similar kinship systems, class 
structures, and leisure activities are indicators of 
converging .structures of social relationships (p. 21). 
According to Inkeles, the systems of popular attitudes, 
values, and behavior show the least evidence of similarity 
except in the structure of opinion. That is, the distribution 
of opinion across ce~tain stratification systems (such as 
socioeconomic status, race, gender, age, etc.) shows a similar 
structure, while average opinion (absent the controls 
stratification) provides little support for increasing global 
similarity (p. 22). He attributes these different conclusions 
to the idea that different life experiences among individuals 
of different stratification systems are expected to produce 
different values. 
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As in the modernization hypothesis, Inkeles suggests that 
as individual life experiences become more similar, so will 
attitudes, values, and basic dispositions. However, he does 
not believe these attitudes will ever become totally alike due 
to different cultural, national history, and socioeconomic 
conditions (p. 22). 
Finally, Inkeles notes that while there is some 
similarity in systems of political and economic control, this 
• similarity is primarily in the growing number of ways the 
state exerts control over its citizens (p. 23). He argues that 
substantial differences in the nature of the state, its 
organization, and the distribution of power still exist. The 
debate between the proper degree of centralization or 
decentralization illustrates these differences. In my view, 
globalization itself may impact this element of the social 
system since many scholars have found evidence that the growth 
of multinational corporations and global governing bodies 
forces nation-states to alter their structures, their 
distribution of power, and their very nature. 
Inkeles also describes several forces that can lead to 
growing similarities among individuals and nations. He asserts 
that technological changes, such as computers, satellites, and 
industrialization, will induce similarity among nations and 
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individuals. Ecological changes, such as urbanization (or more 
recently suburbanization), encourage individuals to adapt 
values and relationships to fit better the needs of the new 
environment. Changes in the law (like civil rights) actually 
may require changes in values to avoid punishment for 
noncompliance. 
Finally, centers of cultural influences like the mass 
media may induce changes in the conceptions of morality, 
freedom, individualism, etc. Globalization certainly can be 
considered a change in the social structure that requires 
individuals and nations to adapt to and adopt certain values 
and expectations. Thus, both Kerr (1983) and Inkeles (1998) 
argue that the available evidence suggests that some elements 
of the social system are similar in modern society, but that 
systems of popular attitudes, values, and behavior and systems 
of political and economic control continue to display distinct 
differences. In addition, Inkeles argues that these 
differences are the result of specific experiences of 
individuals or nations based on systems of stratification such 
as levels of wealth, education, etc. 
Francis Fukuyama (1999) expands on the ideas discussed 
above by arguing that there exist certain values or attributes 
that are universal. Specifically, he identifies the desire for 
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m~terial progress and market exchange (p. 1). He claims that 
in countries without market exchange, government is the source 
of restriction rather than the lack of an individual-level 
value structure (p. 1). He also argues that globalization 
will lead to a greater emphasis on individualism, especially 
as it relates to economic realms of life (p. 2). However, 
Fukuyama does not believe values will become universal in all 
realms of culture. In fact~ he argues that economic 
interdependence and an emphasis placed on individualism will 
allow nations and individuals to emphasize cultural 
differences in many other elements of the social system. Thus, 
Fukuyama agrees with Moore (1979) and Inkeles (1998) when he 
argues that globalization will lead to greater similarity in 
some aspects of the social system (specifically economi~ 
values), but may have a smaller effect on others, such as, 
political control, religion, ethnicity, and social networks 
(p. 1). With this in mind, I expect that when exploring global 
value changes, those values that relate to work or economics 
will be more likely to become similar than values relating to 
social or political values. 
The preceding discussion provides an in-depth exploration 
into the theoretical framework of globalization and its impact 
on culture. The first section discussed the evidence that 
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globalization exists or is occurring. Based on this evidence, 
the second section reviewed the literature that deals with the 
impact of globalization on the social system and culture. 
Finally, the third section specifically explored the current 
evidence that suggests that nations are becoming more similar 
in some elements of the social system, but are either becoming 
more diverse in other elements or resisting the forces of 
convergence and maintaining their unique cultural attributes. 
This discussion leads me to the formal statements of 
purpose for this thesis: 
1) The following analysis is intended to describe and 
explore global value change. Thus, I will discuss 
methodological options for examining value changes and 
relative similarity in dispersion. Through this discussion, 
it is hoped that a useful model for future analysis will be 
developed to take advantage of the growing cross-national data 
becoming available. 
2) More specifically, I will seek to determine whether 
the values of nations and individuals are becoming more 
similar (converging), staying the same relative distance apart 
(maintaining diversity), or becoming less similar (diverging). 
3) Given the evidence in the literature, I expect values 
pertaining to economic or individualistic goals to display 
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convergence. Likewise, I expect values relating to political 
and social goals either to maintain current diversity or to 
display divergence. The following section will better define 
the measures and methods necessary to achieve such goals. 
More importantly, it will provide better illustration of the 
various forms of value change. 
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CHAPTER 3: MEASURES AND METHODOLOGY 
The following analysis of global value change uses data 
collected through the World Value Survey (WVS). This set of 
data provides an especially rich source of information on 
global values. It offers cross-national comparison over two 
time periods, 1981 and 1990. The 1981 survey was administered 
in twenty-four nations around the world while the 1990 survey 
was expanded to include forty-three nations representing 
nearly 70 percent of global population and ranging from very 
poor societies such as Nigeria, China, and India to the 
richest of societies like Switzerland, the United States, and 
Japan (Inglehart, 1997, Appendix 1). Of the countries 
available in these surveys, twenty-two were surveyed in both 
1981 and 1990. These countries are included in Table 3. 
Table 3. Countries Surveyed in Both the 1981 & 1990 World 
Value Surveys. 
Argentina Belgium Britain Canada Denmark 
Finland France Hungary Iceland Ireland 
Italy Japan Mexico Netherlands Northern 
Ireland 
Norway South Spain Sweden United 
Africa States 
West 
Germany 
22 
However, due to inconsistencies in the data, South Korea and 
Denmark are not included in the current analysis. For a more 
complete discussion of these inconsistencies, see Inglehart 
(1997, Appendix 1). Thus, twenty countries are available for 
a time series analysis of value change. 
In addition, the World Values Survey provides a large 
number of variables from which to choose for analysis. Nearly 
200 questions were asked in both the 1981 and 1990 surveys. 
The topics include economic, social, political, moral, and 
religious beliefs, opinions, values, etc. However, not all of 
these questions were selected for the present analysis for two 
primary reasons. The first reason is purely economical. That 
is, the analysis of two hundred variables would require far 
more paper and time to explore than would be justified by the 
additional depth in description. 
The second reason is more theoretical. Opinions and 
measures of satisfaction are far too fluid for a meaningful 
comparison of global value change. In other words, these types 
of beliefs are frequently changing in response to a variety of 
environmental factors. For example, a question that asks 'how 
satisfied or dissatisfied with your job?' may change several 
times in the same year as fluctuations in the economy 
influence demand for the employer's product or causes the 
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respondent to lose his or her job. In addition, the answer to 
this type of question may depend on more deeply held values 
such as how much freedom people feel they should be allowed at 
work or how much they feel they should be getting paid for the 
type of work they do. Thus, the questions included in the 
present analysis include questions such as asking "how should 
business be managed?", but do not include questions as to 
whether one's current job meets these standards. The latter 
question may be helpful in explaining why values change, i.e., 
changing one's underlying values to match his or her 
particular situation, but does not clearly represent what 
those underlying values are and how they have changed. 
According to the previous discussion, I have selected 
seventy-six questions asked in both the 1981 and 1990 surveys. 
Nearly every question was asked in each country, which allows 
for an excellent cross-national comparison of value changes. 
For ease of explanation and as an initial test of secondary 
hypotheses, these questions were placed in four main 
categories. These categories are not intended to be definitive 
groupings of the variables, but instead to serve as more 
manageable groups of variables to test the hypothesis that 
economic values are expected to converge while social and 
political values are expected to maintain diversity or 
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diverge. 
Clearly, a more scientific grouping of the questions such 
as factor analysis will provide a more firm foundation for 
placing these variables into broader categories. However, the 
groupings used here are based at least on theoretical 
relationships among the variables and should provide an 
acceptable substitution for more scientific groupings until 
these scientific groupings can be tested with further 
research. Thus, a brief description of each of the variables 
included each category follows. 
The Individual, Work, and Economy category is defined by 
twenty-four variables ranging from questions involving the 
respondent's belief in the importance of individual 
development to the best structure of the nation's economy. The 
full range of questions are included in Table 4 below. 
Questions ranging from how important good housing is to a 
successful marriage and whether marriage is an outdated 
institution along with twenty other questions are included in 
the second broad category: Marriage and Family. Table 4 also 
provides a brief description of the twenty-two questions 
included in this category. 
The Government and Politics category is made up of ten 
questions ranging from the acceptability of cheating on taxes 
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to the willingness to fight for one's country in the next war. 
As a political scientist I am disappointed in the lack of good 
questions relating to political values, but as a student of 
public policy I understand that each value in the other realms 
can and does have a large impact on governmental decision 
making. These variables are also included in Table 4. 
Finally, Table 4 includes variables in the broader 
category: Morality, Religion, and Sexuality. These twenty 
questions range from the acceptance of abortion to whether 
killing it in self-defense is justifiable. This category 
offers the broadest range of values and if my hypotheses are 
Table 4. Broad Theoretical Categories and Brief Variable 
Descriptions. 
Individual, Work, and Economy 
v99: Good Pay 
Important 
Aspect of Job 
v103: Chance of 
Promotion 
Important 
Aspect of Job 
v107: Useful 
for Society 
Important 
Aspect of Job 
vlll: 
Responsible 
Important 
Aspect of Job 
vl00: Pleasant 
Co-workers 
Important 
Aspect of Job 
v104: Job 
Respected 
Important 
Aspect of Job 
v108: Generous 
Holidays 
Important 
Aspect of Job 
V 112: 
Interesting 
Important 
Aspect of Job 
vl0l: Little 
Pressure 
Important 
Aspect of Job 
v105: Good 
Hours Important 
Aspect of Job 
v109: Meet 
People 
Important 
Aspect of Job 
v113: Meet's My 
Abilities 
Important 
Aspect of Job 
vl02: Job 
Security 
Important 
Aspect of Job 
v106: 
Opportunity for 
Initiative 
Important 
Aspect of Job 
vll0: Achieve 
Something 
Important 
Aspect of Job 
v125: More 
Efficient 
Secretary Paid 
More Money 
Table 4. 
(Continued) 
v126: How v127: Following 
Business Should Instructions at 
Be Managed Work 
v266: Emphasize 
Development of 
Technology 
v267: Emphasize 
Development of 
Individuals 
Marriage and Family 
v198: 
Successful 
Marriage--
Faithfulness 
v202: 
Successful 
Marriage--
Shared 
Religious 
Beliefs 
v206: 
Successful 
Marriage--Live 
Apart from In-
Laws 
v210: 
Successful 
Marriage--
Common 
Interests 
v217: Woman as 
a Single Parent 
v304: Married 
Men/Women 
Having an 
Affair 
v199: 
Successful 
Marriage--
Adequate Income 
v203: 
Successful 
Marriage--Good 
Housing 
v207: 
Successful 
Marriage--Happy 
Sexual 
Relationship 
v213: Ideal 
Family Size 
v224: Respect 
for Parents: 
Absolute or 
Earned? 
v310: Divorce 
Justified? 
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v264: Emphasis 
on Money & 
Material 
Possessions 
v270: Emphasize 
a More Natural 
Lifestyle 
v200: 
Successful 
Marriage--Same 
Social 
Background 
v204: 
Successful 
Marriage--
Agreement on 
Politics 
v208: 
Successful 
Marriage--Share 
Household 
Chores 
v214: Child in 
Home with a 
Mother and 
Father 
v225: Parents 
Sacrifice Self 
for Children 
v265: 
Importance of 
Work in Our 
Lives 
v271: Benefits 
of Scientific 
Advances 
v201: 
Successful 
Marriage--
Mutual Respect 
v205: 
Successful 
Marriage--
Understanding 
and Tolerance 
v209: 
Successful 
Marriage--
Children 
v216: Marriage 
is an Outdated 
Institution 
v269: More 
Emphasis on 
Family Life 
Table 4. 
(Continued) 
Government and Politics 
v247: Freedom 
or Equality 
More Important? 
v268: More 
Respect for 
Authority in 
Society 
V315: 
Threatening 
Workers who 
Refuse to Join 
Strike 
Justified? 
v248: Views on 
Left/Right 
Scale 
v296: Claiming 
Government 
Benefits Not 
Entitled To 
V317: Political 
Assassinations 
Justified? 
Morality, Religion, and Sexuality 
v142: Good and 
Evil--
Guidelines or 
Absolutes? 
v239: Abortion 
if Woman 
Unmarried? 
v300: Joyriding 
Justified? 
v305: Sex Under 
Legal Age of 
Consent 
Justified? 
v312: 
Euthanasia 
Justified? 
v175: God is 
Personal, 
Spirit, Does 
Not Exist? 
v240: Abortion 
if Do Not Want 
More Children? 
v301:Marijuana 
Use Justified? 
v306: Accepting 
a Bribe 
Justified? 
v313: Suicide 
Justified? 
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v249: Societal 
Change: 
Revolution 
Reform, or 
Defended 
v298: Cheating 
on Taxes if 
Have the Chance 
v237: Abortion 
for Mother's 
Health? 
v297: Avoiding 
Public Fare 
Justified? 
v302: Keeping 
Money Found 
Justified? 
v307: 
Homosexuality 
Justified? 
v314: Not 
Reporting 
Damaging a 
Parked Car 
Justified? 
v263: 
Willingness to 
Fight for 
Country 
v311: Fighting 
with the Police 
Justified? 
v238: Abortion 
for Handicapped 
Child? 
v299: Buying 
Stolen Goods 
Justified? 
v303: Lying in 
Own Interest 
Justified? 
v308: 
Prostitution 
Justified? 
v316: Killing 
in Self-Defense 
Justified? 
Source: World Values Survey 1981-1990. Variable numbers correspond with the 
actual numbers used by the survey group. For complete wording, see the 
codebook for study #6160 available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu. 
28 
correct will show the greatest resistance to convergence. 
To test for changes in these values, I employ an 
interrupted time series analysis of the mean values for 1981 
and 1990. To achieve more theoretical and descriptive depth, 
the analysis is performed at both the individual and aggregate 
levels. The globalization hypothesis predicts changes in 
individual-level values; however, these values changes may be 
filtered through a national perspective. Thus, we might expect 
individual-level value change to move in an entirely opposite 
direction of aggregated value changes since national and local 
identities and the relative arbitrariness of national borders 
are likely to result in "pockets" of similar beliefs or 
values. 
In other words, even if we find similar values at the 
individual level, we might still see continuing diversity or 
convergence at the aggregate level. By examining value change 
at both levels of measurement, we can avoid both the 
individual and ecological fallacies in our interpretation of 
global value change. Further, an examination of aggregate-
level values allows us to assess the structure of values as 
they are stratified by nation. This assessment provides 
additional depth, for we are able not only to analyze the 
evidence of individual-level convergence or divergence, but 
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also to assess this evidence as it relates to the cross-
national value structure. 
A difference of means t-test was performed on the mean 
scores for 1981 and the mean scores for 1990 for each question 
at both the individual and aggregate level. This test allows 
us to assess the movement in average values from 1981 to 1990. 
From this assessment, we can describe changing values 
according to a variety of indicators such as more liberal, 
conservative, tolerant, individualistic, etc. In addition, an 
F-test is performed for each question to determine whether a 
statistical difference exists in the variance or spread of the 
data. From this test we can determine whether the average 
values are more similar, less similar, or exhibit no change in 
relative dispersion. 
One final part is essential to the discussion of data, 
measures, and methodology. That is, a discussion of what is 
meant by the terms 'convergence,' 'divergence,' 'homogeneity,' 
and 'diversity.' As defined by Kerr (1983), convergence is 
the tendency for societies to grow more alike, to develop 
similarities in structures, processes, and performances. 
Divergence, then, is the tendency for societies to recede from 
each other, to develop greater dissimilarities in. structures, 
processes, and performances. In short, convergence and 
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divergence refer to directions of movement over time either to 
more uniformity or homogeneity or to more diversity or 
heterogeneity. Thus, homogeneity and diversity refer to the 
existing conditions at a specific moment in time _while 
convergence and divergence refer to movement toward these 
moments. Homogeneity exists when there is a uniform system of 
structures, processes, and performances while diversity or 
heterogeneity exists when there is variety in these 
structures, processes, and performances (p. 3). 
Inkeles (1998) identifies six different types of 
convergence or divergence. In sum they represent the 
possibilities for value change over time. Each of these types 
has unique attributes valuable to the present analysis both in 
terms of theoretical depth in description as well as in power 
of explanation. The first type of convergence is simple 
convergence. In this form, all nations begin either above or 
below some common fixed destination at the first time point 
and move closer to the common point by the end of the second 
time point. An example of such convergence is 100 percent 
primary school enrollment (p. 30). At the time of first 
measurement (year 1), nations may all be below 100 percent 
enrollment with some farther from this point than others. At 
the time of the second measurement (year 2), however, all 
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nations may have moved closer to 100 percent enrollment. 
Thus, even though individual nations may have been 
farther from the common destination at year 1, their movement 
converges toward a common point (in this case 100 percent). 
The level of uniformity or homogeneity is measured at year 1 
and at year 2. Convergence occurs when the level of 
homogeneity at year 1 (as measured by the variance in the mean 
scores for all nations combined) is less than the homogeneity 
at year 2.. Conversely, divergences occurs when the level of 
homogeneity at year 1 is greater than the level at year 2. 
Figure 1 illustrates this type of convergence and divergence 
more clearly. 
The second type of convergence is convergence from 
different directions. In this case, convergence occurs when 
nations either increase or decrease from previous positions 
toward some common point. Some nations may be below the common 
point and have to increase their mean values, while others may 
be above the common point and have to decrease their mean 
values. What is important is that for convergence to have 
occurred, the variance between the mean scores at year 1 must 
be greater than the means scores at year 2 and some nations 
must have been below the new mean while others were below the 
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Simple Divergence Simple Convergence 
100~--------------
\ 
0-+------------,,--------,-------------,-------------"[ 
1981 1990 1981 
Figure 1. Simple Convergence and Simple Divergence 
(Hypothetical Data). 
1990 
new mean. An example may be the preferred age at marriage (p. 
31). Due to cultural differences, some countries may have 
preferred older people to marry while in other countriespeople 
much younger may be allowed and encouraged to marry. However, 
if in response to global awareness of these differences, both 
the countries with higher age preferences and the countries 
with lower preferences moved toward a middle ground, a 
convergence from different directions would be observed. In 
contrast, divergence is observed if, in response to these 
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Convergence Divergence 
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, ' 60--i--,.-----------~~ / ' ••• ' ••• ••• ••• • 
40--i----+---~-------~~--' # / ' / # ' 20~-----------------
0----t---~---~---.--------~ 
1981 1990 1981 1990 
Figure 2. Convergence and Divergence from Different Directions 
(Hypothetical Data). 
differences, the countries move in opposite directions to 
preserve their differences or if either country moves away 
from the middle ground in order to reassert their cultural 
values. Figure 2 above illustrates such convergence or 
divergence. 
However, convergence may also occur within very diverse 
values. Figure 3 shows the case in which values converge to a 
common point, but maintain real differences from that time 
forward. For example, there may be substantial convergence 
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around the value of allowing females to go outside the home, 
but there may remain significant differences in the situations 
in which they are allowed to go out alone or go out with a man 
(p. 33-34). Thus, convergence to the threshold of allowing 
females outside the home may actually mask important 
differences in how this value is applied. The present 
analysis does not evaluate such convergence except as a post 
hoc explanation for any lack of significant value change. To 
be sure of such convergence, at least three time periods must 
Thresholds versus Absolute Differences 
100~--------------
o______,..__------~-------
1970 1981 1990 
Threshold 
Figure 3. Convergence Around Thresholds and Continuing 
Absolute Differences (Hypothetical Data). 
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be available for study. Figure 3 provides ample proof of the 
importance of an intermediate time period in assessing such 
threshold effects. 
Convergence may also take different paths to the common 
point. For example, some nations may seek to decrease birth 
rates in response to declining death rates. However, others, 
like China, may seek to decrease birth rates to meet entirely 
different demands or stimuli. This type of convergence is 
especially relevant to the debate between globalization theory 
and modernization theory discussed above. Although the present 
analysis does not specifically test for these different 
stimuli, the previous discussion and review of the relevant 
literature suggests globalization will have effects 
independent of levels of economic wealth or modernization. In 
addition, the comparison of individual-level evidence and 
aggregate-level evidence should prove useful in distinguishing 
at least between the effects of living in a particular nation 
and the effects of interacting in a more interdependent world 
social system. 
A fifth type of convergence is defined as qualitative 
indicators. These are those aspects of the cultural or social 
system that are not easily quantified. Examples of these types 
of indicators of convergence include legislative and 
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constitutional provisions or the spread of eating habits or 
popular culture. In fact, Boli (1979) argues that national 
constitutions are convergent in progressively incorporating 
guarantees by the state to provide its citizens with access to 
education and health care. However, as noted previously, many 
individuals may never interact in any meaningful way with 
someone from outside their own nation. Thus, while 
quantitative measures may show evidence of convergence, it may 
not apply to a vast number of individuals who do not interact 
globally. 
The final type of convergence defined by Inkeles (1998) 
is that of parallel change. This type of convergence is most 
difficult to identify, but more readily applies to the 
examination of convergence in values. Parallel change implies 
differences in the level of uniformity, but not necessarily in 
a change of positions relative to one another. Figure 4 better 
illustrates such a situation. For example, all twenty 
nations in the present analysis may move in a positive 
direction with regard to the value of free market exchange to 
the development of individuals, but their relative distances 
from one another may not change. Thus, we may say that the 
value of free market exchange is becoming a more important 
value across nations, but the extent to which individual 
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Figure 4. Parallel Change (No Convergence or Divergence). 
nations value free market exchange remains as diverse as in 
earlier years. 
Now that I have discussed the methodology and various 
types of convergence, it is time to test these hypotheses and 
analyze the results. First, I will restate the hypotheses in 
the light of the different types of convergence and the four 
categories of values discussed above. The first hypothesis is 
that economic or individualistic values are expected to 
converge. Second, it is likely that this convergence will be 
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simple in that value changes are likely to move from being 
less supportive of free market exchange and individualism to 
becoming more supportive of these values. Third, family, 
political, and moral values are expected to diverge or at 
least maintain diversity. In maintaining diversity, there may 
still be evidence 0£ parallel change. In addition, divergence 
may be either simple or from different directions. 
any differences in the results of the individual and 
aggregate-level analyses will be addressed. 
Finally, 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
In general, the results of the aggregate-level analysis 
suggest that nations are placing an increasing emphasis on 
individualism, freedom, and family life while becoming less 
concerned for values of political authority, political 
honesty, and general morality. However, many of these changes 
are not significantly different from previous values, 
indicating a fairly strong level of stability in values over 
time. In fact, only ten of the seventy-six variables examined 
here showed significantly different values from 1981 to 1990 
at the .05 level of confidence. 
With regard to values in the broader category of 
Individual, Work, and Economy, the twenty nations studied here 
identified good pay, pleasant co-workers, job security, the 
opportunity to achieve something, meeting abilities, and 
interesting as important aspect of a job. Of these qualities, 
good pay is most important and became substantially more 
important from 1981 to 1990. In contrast, the absence of 
pressure, promotions, job respect, good hours, the necessity 
to use initiative, the usefulness to society, generous 
holidays, the opportunity to meet people, and whether or not 
the job is responsible are qualities less important for 
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employment. This is in line with our hypothesis that 
development of the individual is more important in a 
globalized society. In addition; the nations in this study 
value efficiency, employee participation in the selection of 
managers, technological development, scientific advances, and 
the development of the individual. Of these values, only the 
value in efficiency increased significantly from 1981 to 1990. 
Again, these values are in line with the hypothesis of support 
for individualism as well as the additional value of free-
market exchange. However, there is no evidence that support 
for these values increased from 1981 to 1990. In fact, at the 
.05 level of significance it is likely we would observe a 
significant difference in the means of one or two variables 
(1.2)by chance alone. Thus, we cannot be sure that the two 
Individual, Work, and Economy-related variables that showed a 
significant change in means were not due to chance. Table 5 
displays the mean scores for each variable in this group. 
Unlike my initial hypotheses, the general direction of 
movement for the 24 questions relating to work, economy, and 
individualism does not show significant evidence of 
convergence. In only three of the twenty-four questions were 
there significant differences between the variances among 
nations in 1981 compared to 1990. Again, this result is not 
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much greater than we would expect to occur by chance. Thus, 
in at least twenty-one values, the nations studied here 
maintained their level of diversity from 1981 to 1990. The 
three questions showing significant changes in variances were 
Table 5. Aggregate-Level Results for Individual, Work, and 
Economy Variables. 
Variable 
Description 
Good Pay Important to 
Job (l=yes, 2=no} 
Pleasant People 
Important to Job 
(l=yes, 2=no} 
No Pressure Important 
to Job (l=yes; 2=no} 
Job Security 
Important to Job 
(l=yes, 2=no} 
Promotions Important 
to Job (l=yes, 2=no} 
Job Respected 
Important to Job 
(l=yes, 2=no} 
Good Hours Important 
to Job (l=yes, 2=no} 
Use Initiative 
Important to Job 
(l=yes, 2=no} 
Useful to Society 
Important to Job 
(l=yes, 2=no} 
Generous Holidays 
Important to Job 
(l=yes, 2=no} 
Meeting People 
Important to Job 
(l=yes, 2=no} 
Achieve Something 
Important to Job 
(l=yes, 2=no} 
Responsible Important 
to Job (l=yes, 2=no} 
Sample 
Size 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
Mean 
1981 
1.314 
1. 323 
1.689 
1.416 
1.653 
1.674 
1.537 
1.579 
1.618 
1. 720 
1.575 
1.503 
1.593 
Mean 
1990 
1.254** 
1.305 
1.679 
1.394 
1. 618 
1. 650 
1.553 
1. 521 
1.603 
1. 724 
1. 548 
1.436 
1. 539 
Variance 
1981 
0.009 
0.014 
0.008 
0.012 
0.016 
0.011 
0.009 
0.010 
0.013 
0.007 
0.004 
0.038 
0.015 
Variance 
1990 
0.007 
0.019 
0.011 
0.014 
0.012 
0.013 
0.023 
0.014 
0. 011 
0.011 
0.014 
0.035 
0.014 
Change in 
Dispersion 
Convergence 
Divergence 
Divergence 
Divergence 
Convergence 
Divergence 
Divergencea 
Divergence 
Convergence 
Divergence 
Divergenceb 
Convergence 
Convergence 
Table 5. 
(Continued) 
Variable 
Description 
Interesting Important 
to Job (l=yes, 2=no) 
Meets Abilities 
Important to Job 
(l=yes, 2=no) . 
Efficient Worker Paid 
More (l=Fair, 
2=Unfair) 
How Business Managed? 
(l=By Owners, 2=By 
Owners & Employees, 
3=By Government, 
4=Employees Own) 
Follow Instructions? 
(l=Should, 2=Depends, 
3=Must be Convinced 
First) 
Less Emphasis on 
Money (l=Good, 
2=Don't Mind, 3=Bad) 
Decrease in 
Importance of Work 
(l=Good, 2=Don't 
Mind, 3=Bad) 
Technological 
Development (l=Good, 
2=Don't Mind, 3=Bad) 
Development of the 
Individual (l=Good, 
2=Don't Mind, 3=Bad) 
Simple, Natural 
Lifestyle (l=Good, 
2=Don't Mind, 3=Bad) 
Scientific Advances 
(l=Will Hurt, 2=Some 
Sample 
Size 
19 
19 
19 
18 
19 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
Mean 
1981 
1.449 
1.504 
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Mean 
1990 
1.413 
1.449 
Variance 
1981 
0.019 
0.017 
1.338 1.245*** 0.008 
1.833 1.800 0.055 
1. 958 1. 992 0.044 
1. 540 1. 550 0.034 
2.241 2.311 0.107 
1. 568 1. 524 0.044 
1. 219 1.181 0.007 
1.223 1.204 0.010 
1. 778 1. 731 0.022 
Variance 
1990 
0.034 
0.015 
0.095 
0.020 
0.039 
0.041 
0.056 
0.038 
0.007 
0.011 
0.016 
change in 
Dispersion 
Divergence 
Convergence 
Divergence 
Convergence a 
Convergence 
Divergence 
Convergence 
Convergence 
Convergence 
Convergence 
Convergence 
** denotes t-test for difference of means significant at .OS level or greater. 
*** denotes t-test for difference of means significant at .01 level or greater. 
a denotes F-test for difference of variance significant at .05 level or greater. 
b denotes F-test for difference of variance significant at .01 level or greater. 
43 
important aspect of a job, and how business should be managed. 
whether good hours or the opportunity to meet people was an 
For the question of how business should be managed, the twenty 
nations became more similar in their relative values. In 
other words, they converged in these values. However, 
regarding the importance of good hours and the opportunity to 
meet someone in a job, the twenty nations diverged, as some 
nations placed greater importance on these traits than others. 
Table 5 above also details the changes in variances from 1981 
to 1990 for the Individual, Work, and Economy-related 
variables. 
For Marriage and Family-related values, the general trend 
is to consider faithfulness, mutual respect, understanding, 
being away from in-laws, a happy sex life, and children as 
very important to a successful marriage. In addition, adequate 
income, good housing, sharing of household chores, and common 
interests are considered rather important. Having the same 
background, religion, or political views are not considered 
important to a successful marriage. Of these values only the 
importance of sharing household roles became significantly 
more important from 1981 to 1990. All the others, except 
religion, background, and politics, became more important, but 
did not display statistically significant differences from 
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1981 to 1990. Further, the twenty nations hold that children 
need a home with both parents to grow up happily and thus do 
not approve of single women having children. They also expect 
parents to sacrifice their own well-being if necessary to 
benefit their children. In return, children are always 
expected to respect their parents regardless of their faults 
or qualities. However, some values appear to contradict one 
another. For example, in most nations marriage is not 
considered an outdated institution, but the married 
individuals having an affair or getting divorced appears to be 
increasingly tolerated behavior judging by the responses to 
questions 304 and 310 presented in table 6. 
One variable that fits nicely with other empirical 
studies is the value of fewer number of children. For the 
nations studied here, the average number of children mentioned 
as the ideal family size decreased from nearly three children 
in 1981 to two and a half by 1990. While such a decrease 
appears small, it is statistically significant at the .05 
level and perhaps even more striking is that the variance 
among nations became significantly smaller from 1981 to 1990. 
This means that the ideal family size (of between two and 
three children) is generally agreed upon among these twenty 
nations. This is consistent with decreasing birth rates in 
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Table 6. Aggregate-Level Results for Marriage and Family 
Variables. 
Variable 
Description 
Faithfulness 
Important to Marriage 
(l=very, 2=rather, 
3=not very) 
Adequate Income 
Important to Marriage 
(l=very, 2=rather, 
3=not very) 
Same Background 
Important to Marriage 
(l=very, 2=rather, 
3=not very) 
Mutual Respect 
Important to Marriage 
(l=very, 2=rather, 
3=not very) 
Religion Important to 
Marriage (l=very, 
2=rather, 3=not very) 
Good Housing 
Important to Marriage 
(l=very, 2=rather, 
3=not very) 
Politics Important to 
Marriage (l=very, 
2=rather, 3=not very) 
Understanding 
Important to Marriage 
(l=very, 2=rather, 
3=not very) 
Away From In-Laws 
Important to Marriage 
(l=very, 2=rather, 
3=not very) 
Happy Sex Life 
Important to Marriage 
(l=very, 2=rather, 
3=not very) 
Share Household 
Chores Important to 
Marriage (l=very, 
2=rather, 3=not very) 
Children Impo-rtant to 
Marriage (l=very, 
2=rather, 3=not very) 
Common Interests 
Important to Marriage 
(l=very, 2=rather, 
3=not very) 
Sample 
Size 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
Mean 
1981 
1.192 
Mean 
1990 
1.160 
1.730 1.720 
2.175 2.198 
1.185 1.138 
2.145 2.174 
1. 745 1. 754 
2.509 2.574 
1. 224 1. 200 
1.835 1.793 
1.381 1.379 
1.950 1.8036** 
1.544 1.455 
1. 703 1. 696 
Variance 
1981 
0.007 
.o. 016 
O.Oll 
0.007 
0.030 
0.017 
0.032 
0.007 
0.097 
0.019 
0.042 
0.028 
0.022 
Variance 
1990 
0.006 
0.025 
0.014 
0.004 
0.046 
0.013 
0.012 
0.003 
0.052 
0.019 
0.032 
0.023 
0.020 
Change in 
Dispersion 
Convergence 
Divergence 
Divergence 
Convergence 
Divergence 
Convergence 
Convergencea 
Convergence a 
Convergence 
Convergence 
Convergence 
Convergence 
Convergence 
Table 6. 
(Continued) 
Variable 
Description 
Ideal Size of Family 
(actual number of 
children) 
Children Need Both 
Parents in Home 
(l=Agree, 2=Disagree) 
Marriage Outdated 
Institution (1-Yes, 
2=No) 
Woman as Single 
Parent (l=Approve, 
2=Depends, 
3=Disapprove) 
Children Respect 
Parents (l=Regardless 
of Qualities or 
Faults, 2=Must be 
Earned by Parents) 
Parents' 
Responsibilities 
(l=Sacrifice for 
child's well-being, 
2=Neither, 3=Parents 
have own life) 
More Emphasis on 
Family Life (l=Good 
thing, 2=Both, 3=Bad) 
Married Man/Woman 
Have Affair (l=Never 
justified, 2-9= 
depends, l0=Always 
justified) 
Divorce (l=Never 
justified, 2-9= 
depends, l0=Always 
if' 
Sample 
Size 
20 
19 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
Mean 
1981 
2.991 
1.211 
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Mean 
1990 
2.7127** 
1.1366** 
Variance 
1981 
0.259 
0.011 
1.822 1.8610** 0.003 
2.000 2.014 0.081 
1.327 1.309 0.018 
1.564 1.507 0.039 
1.162 1.123 0.007 
2.474 2.572 0.249 
4.730 5.3289** 0.496 
Variance 
1990 
0 .112 
0.006 
0.003 
0.088 
0.021 
0.032 
0.008 
0.362 
0.740 
Change in 
Dispersion 
Convergence a 
Convergence 
No Change 
Divergence 
Divergence 
Convergence 
Divergence 
Divergence 
Divergence 
** denotes t-test for difference of means significant at .05 ·1evel or greater. 
*** denotes t-test for difference of means significant at .01 level or greater. 
a denotes F-test for difference of variance significant at .05 level or greater. 
b denotes F-test for difference of variance significant at .01 level or greater. 
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Table 6 above details the movement of these and the other 
variables relating to Marriage and Family regarding 
convergence, divergence, or maintaining diversity. 
Politics and Government is the third broad category of 
values to be explored here. The general trend in these values 
is of valuing increased freedom and individualism as displayed 
by the proportion of those who do not mind a decreased 
emphasis placed on respect for authority or who find various 
methods of public dissent acceptable. Specifically, the mean 
scores for the nations in this study tend to lie slightly left 
of middle on the political spectrum. Although their citizens 
appear willing to fight for their country, they are also more 
tolerant of fighting with the police or threatening workers 
who do not join a strike. In addition, there is moderate 
acceptance of claiming governmental benefits not entitled to 
oneself or cheating on one's taxes. Finally, and somewhat 
disconcerting for political leaders or their opponents, 
political assassinations are acceptable for an average of 
about twenty-five percent of the citizens in these nations. 
Table 7 shows the results for each variable. 
For the ten Government and Politics-related variables, 
eight maintained diversity from 1981 to 1990. The two 
variables showing significant differences in variances were on 
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the self-placement on the political spectrum and claiming 
government benefits to which you are not entitled. Self-
placement on the political spectrum converged, displaying more 
uniformity in value placement in 1990, while claiming benefits 
diverged, displaying more diversity in beliefs. This is 
somewhat consistent to earlier predictions if we consider that 
a placement on the left portion of the politi9al spectrum 
generally represents more individual rights and benefits. In 
addition, the acceptance of claiming government benefits even 
when one is not entitled to those benefits implies a greater 
tolerance for individual decision making and individual 
rights. However, more sophisticated analysis is needed to 
develop the relationship between these post-hoc explanations 
and actual relationships. 
Beyond these two variables, the other eight variables 
maintained current diversity which is in accordance with the 
hypothesis that political values will either diverge or 
maintain diversity. However, if the preceding post hoc 
explanation proves salient, we would have expected divergence 
in all of the other variables. Although the results are not 
statistically significant, seven of the eight other variables 
did diverge slightly from 1981 to 1990 as shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Aggregate-level Results for Government and Politics 
Variables. 
Variable 
Description 
Which is More 
Important? 
(l=Freedom, 
2=Depends, 
3=Equality) 
Self-Placement on 
Ideological Spectrum 
(l=Left, lO=Right) 
Feelings Toward 
Society (l=Must Be 
Radically Changed, 
2=Reformed, 
3=Defended Against 
Subversive Forces 
Willing to Fight for 
Country? (l=Yes, 
2=No) 
Greater Respect for 
Authority in Future 
(l=Good, 2=Don't 
Mind, 3=Bad) 
Claiming Benefits Not 
Entitled To (l=Never 
Justified, 2-
9=Depends, lO=Always 
Justified) 
Cheating on Taxes 
(l=Never Justified, 
2-9=Depends, 
lO=Always Justified) 
Fighting with Police 
(l=Never Justified, 
2 - 9 =Depends, 
lO=Always Justified) 
Threatening Workers 
Refusing to Join 
Strike (l=Never 
Justified, 2-
9=Depends, lO=Always 
Justified) 
Political 
Assassinations 
(l=Never Justified, 
2-9=Depends, 
1 Al 
Sample 
Size 
20 
19 
18 
20 
20 
20 
19 
19 
19 
20 
Mean 
1981 
1.801 
Mean 
1990 
1. 800 
5.691 5.514 
2 .155 2 .119 
1. 362 1. 350 
1. 611 1. 692 
1.966 2.364 
2.640 2.678 
2.258 2.592 
1.831 1.859 
1. 592 1. 821 
Variance 
1981 
0.028 
0.423 
0.017 
0.034 
0.154 
0.306 
0.387 
0.267 
0.155 
0.167 
Variance 
1990 
0.033 
0.188 
0.010 
0.037 
0.188 
0.937 
0.412 
0.392 
0.286 
0.232 
Change in 
Dispersion 
Divergence 
Convergencea 
Convergence 
Divergence 
Divergence 
Divergenceb 
Divergence 
Divergence 
Divergence 
Divergence 
** denotes t-test for difference of means significant at .05 level or greater. 
*** denotes t-test for difference of means significant at .01 level or greater. 
a denotes F-test for difference of variance significant at .05 level or greater. 
b denotes F-test for difference of variance significant at .01 level or greater. 
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The final group of variables for the aggregate analysis 
are related to Morality, Religion, and Sexuality. In these 
variables we see a general increase in individual choice, but 
a corresponding decrease in honesty or what is generally 
referred to as morality. The abortion issue is an extremely 
volatile public policy issue in the United States and in many 
other nations. However, it appears there is a general 
consensus among the twenty nations studied here that abortion 
is acceptable if the mother's health is in danger or if the 
child will be handicapped, but not acceptable simply if the 
mother is unmarried or if the parents do not want an 
additional child. Also, individual choice is more acceptable 
in such issues as homosexuality, euthanasia, and suicide. All 
three of these values have generated important public policy 
dilemmas. However, this general tolerance of individual 
choice also applies to values relating to general honesty or 
morality such as avoiding the fare on public transportation, 
buying stolen goods, joyriding, or using marijuana. Further, 
keeping money that is found, lying in one's own interest, and 
not reporting hitting a parked car are considered somewhat 
justifiable by the twenty nations in this study. Each of 
these 'tolerances' may have important public policy 
implications that may require cross-nat.ional collaboration to 
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deal with efficiently. 
The two questions relating to religion reveal that good 
and evil are considered to be dependent on circumstances 
rather than absolute guidelines from which we decide to act. 
Also, if God is acknowledged to exist (as is the case by an 
average of about 90 percent of respondents in each nation) the 
feeling is that God is a spirit or unknown rather than a 
personal being. However, of these 20 variables only three 
showed significant changes from 1981 to 1990. The 
acceptability of homosexuality, suicide, and euthanasia all 
increased· significantly during this time period. Table 8 
details these changes as well as for the other variables 
relating to morality, religion, and sexuality. 
The variances relating to the above vari~bles moved 
according to the previously hypothesized direction. That is, 
fully eighty percent of the variables showed weak evidence of 
divergence. However, only one of these was statistically 
significant at the .05 level. Thus, we must conclude that 
these values maintained their diversity over this time period. 
Nevertheless, values relating to the acceptability of 
joyriding·became more diverse from 1981 to 1990 even though it 
is possible this result is due to chance. These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that social values will 
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Table 8. Aggregate-Level Results for Morality, Religion, and 
Sexuality Variables. 
Variable Sample Mean Mean Variance Variance Change in 
Descriptions Size 1981 1990 1981 1990 Dispersion 
Good & Evil 20 2.379 2.308 0.037 0.052 Divergence 
(l=Absolute 
Guidelines, 
2=Neither, 
3=Circumstances 
Dictate) 
What is God? 19 1. 958 1.946 0.130 0.148 Divergence 
( l=Personal, 2=Spirit 
or Life Force; 
3=Unsure, 4=No God) 
Abortion OK: Mother's 20 1.121 1.117 O.Oll 0.008 Convergence 
Health (l=Yes, 2=No) 
Abortion OK: 20 1. 253 
Handicapped Child 
1. 299 0. 027 0.028 Divergence 
(l=Yes, 2=NO) 
Abortion OK: Mother 20 1.695 1.698 0. 039 0.022 Convergence 
Unmarried (l=Yes, 
2=No) 
Abortion OK: No Want 20 1. 644 1. 665 0. 049 0.026 Convergence 
Child (l=Yes, 2=No) 
Avoid Transport Fare 19 2.133 2.331 0.240 0.365 Divergence 
(l=Never Justified, 
2-9=Depends, l0=Never 
Justified) 
Buying Stolen Goods 20 1.702 1.821 0.155 0.242 Divergence 
(l=Never Justified, 
2-9=Depends, l0=Never 
Justified) 
Joyriding (l=Never 19 1. 352 1.455 0.050 0.196 Divergenceb 
Justified, 2-
9=Depends, l0=Never 
Justified) 
Using Marijuana 20 1.705 1.700 0.174 0.181 Divergence 
(l=Never Justified, 
2-9=Depends, l0=Never 
Justified) 
Keeping Money Found 19 2.922 3.329 0. 711 0.970 Divergence 
(l=Never Justified, 
2-9=Depends, l0=Never 
Justified) 
Lying in Own Interest 20 2.654 2.849 0.336 0.526 Divergence 
(l=Never Justified, 
2-9=Depends, l0=Never 
Justified) 
Sex Under Legal Age 20 2.494 2.695 1.034 1.145 Divergence 
of Consent (l=Never 
Justified, 2-
9=Depends, l0=Never 
Justified) 
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Table 8 . 
(Continued) 
Variable Sample Mean Mean Variance Variance Change in 
Descriptions Size 1981 1990 1981 1990 Dispersion 
Accepting Bribes 20 1.764 1.755 0.146 0.197 Divergence 
(l=Never Justified, 
2-9=Depends, lO=Never 
Justified) 
Homosexuality 20 3.073 3.7771** 0.992 1.385 Divergence 
(l=Never Justified, 
2-9=Depends, lO=Never 
Justified) 
Prostitution(l=Never 20 2.598 2.914 0.576 0.801 Divergence 
Justified, 2-
9=Depends, lO=Never 
Justified) 
Euthanasia (l=Never 20 3.762 4.4431** 0.951 0.848 Convergence 
Justified, 2-
9=Depends, lO=Never 
Justified) 
Suicide (l=Never 20 2.399 2.8175** 0 .294 0.482 Divergence 
Justified, 2-
9=Depends, lO=Never 
Justified) 
Not Reporting Hitting 19 2.004 2.093 0.167 0.366 Divergence 
Parked Car (l=Never 
Justified, 2-
9=Depends, lO=Never 
Justified) 
Killing in Self- 20 5.140 5.395 0.684 0.534 Convergence 
Defense (l=Never 
Justified, 2-
9=Depends, lO=Never 
** denotes ·t-test for difference of means significant at .05 ·1evel or greater. 
*** denotes t-test for difference of means significant at .01 level or greater. a denotes F-test for difference of variance significant at .05 level or greater. 
b denotes F-test for difference of variance significant at .01 level or greater. 
maintain diversity or become more diverse as individualism is 
embraced as a global value. Table 8 displays the differences 
in variances from 1981 to 1990 for the variables relating to 
morals, religion, and sexuality. 
The main conclusion from the preceding analysis is that 
individualism is becoming a more universal value. In addition, 
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values appear to be becoming more liberal in that they are 
more tolerant of individual choices. The possible exception to 
this observation is with values relating to family and 
marriage. The values in this category appear to be more 
traditional in scope. For example, there is a strong belief 
that children need a home with both parents in order to grow 
up happy. Also, children are expected to respect their parents 
regardless of their qualities or faults. 
Finally, most values show a remarkable stability over 
time as shown by the fact that only ten of the seventy-six 
variables examined showed significant changes over time. 
Further, only nine variables showed a significant difference 
in variance, with four displaying divergence and five 
displaying convergence. Thus, the vast majority of variables 
maintained or did not show significant differences in variance 
from 1981 to 1990. Again this illustrates the stability of 
values over time. 
But what is lacking from this discussion is an 
examination of the internal variability of values among these 
nations. That is, the preceding analysis shows little change 
in values as stratified by nation, but we cannot conclude from 
these results that individuals are maintaining diversity. As a 
result, an examination of individual-level value change is the 
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next section of this study. 
Individual-Level Analysis 
In general, the results of the individual-level analysis 
also suggest an increasing emphasis on individualism, freedom, 
and family life as well as less concern for values of 
political authority, political honesty, and general morality. 
However, unlike the results from the aggregate-level analysis, 
nearly every variable showed a significant change in variance 
over this period. Of these variables, twenty-nine displayed 
divergence while thirty showed convergence. Although the most 
of the statistical significance can be attributed to large 
samples sizes (ranging from 23,026 to 32,003 individuals), 
these findings show that the use of aggregate-level analysis 
alone would have resulted in misleading conclusions. Thus, a 
more detailed exploration of the individual-level results 
follows. 
As in the aggregate-level analysis, values in the broader 
category of Individual, Work, and Economy, identified good 
pay, pleasant co-workers, job security, the opportunity to 
achieve something, meeting abilities, and interesting as 
important aspect of a job. Of these qualities, good pay is 
still identified as the most important aspect of a job. 
Likewise, the absence of pressure, promotions, job respect, 
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good hours, the necessity to use initiative, the usefulness to 
society, generous holidays, the opportunity to meet people, 
and whether or not the job is responsible are qualities less 
important for employment. However, among these less important 
qualities, only good hours and generous holidays became less 
valued aspects of employment. All the others, showed a 
significant increase in importance over this period. In 
addition, the individual-level analysis confirms the value of 
efficiency, employee participation in the selection of 
managers, technological development, scientific advances, and 
development of the individual. 
The primary difference between the results of the 
aggregate-level analysis and the individual-level analysis is 
in the level of dispersion or variance in response. Of the 
twenty-four variables relating to economic values, seven 
displayed convergence, six showed divergence, and eleven 
showed no significant change in variance. One variable that 
showed divergence in the aggregate analysis, pleasant co-
workers as an important aspect of a job, displayed significant 
convergence at the individual-level. Overall, the findings 
here still do not appear to support the hypothesis that 
economic, work, or individual related values will tend to 
become more similar in a more global world. Although nearly 
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every variable showed a significant change from 1981 to 1990, 
no clear pattern of convergence or divergence is evident. 
Table 9 shows the movement for each variable in this broad 
theoretical category. 
Table 9. Individual-Level Results for Individual, Work, and 
Ece>nomy Variables. 
Variable Description 
Good Pay Important to Job 
(l=yes, 2=no) 
Pleasant People Important 
to Job (l=yes, 2=no) 
No Pressure Important to 
Job (l=yes, 2=no) 
Job Security Important to 
Job (l=yes, 2=no) 
Promotions Important to 
Job (l=yes, 2=no) 
Job Respected Important 
to Job (l=yes, 2=no) 
Good Hours Important to 
Job (l=yes, 2=no) 
Use Initiative Important 
to Job (l=yes, 2=no) 
Useful to Society 
Important to Job (l=yes, 
2=no) 
Generous Holidays 
Important to Job (l=yes, 
2=no) 
Meeting People Important 
to Job (l=yes, 2=no) 
Achieve Something 
Important to Job (l=yes, 
2=no) 
Responsible Important to 
Job (l=yes, 2=no) 
Interesting Important to 
Job (l=yes, 2=no) 
Mean 1981 
1.335 
n=32003 
1.357 
n=32003 
1. 705 
n=32003 
1.413 
n=32003 
1.655 
n=32003 
1.681 
n=32003 
1.555 
n=32003 
1.574 
n=32003 
1.624 
n=32003 
1. 721 
n=32003 
1.585 
n=32003 
1.497 
n=32003 
1.580 
n=32003 
1.455 
n=32003 
Mean 1990 
1.266*** 
n=28941 
1.329*** 
n=28941 
1. 696** 
n=28941 
1.390*** 
n=28941 
1.625*** 
n=28941 
1.661*** 
n=28941 
1.573*** 
n=28941 
1.530*** 
n=28941 
1.613*** 
n=28941 
1.729** 
n=28941 
1.575** 
n=28941 
1.447*** 
n=28941 
1.534*** 
n=28941 
1.421*** 
n=28941 
Variance 
1981 
0.223 
0.229 
0.208 
0.242 
0.226 
0.217 
0.247 
0.244 
0.234 
0.202 
0.243 
0.250 
0.244 
0.248 
Variance 
1990 
0.195 
0.221 
0.212 
0.238 
0.234 
0.224 
0.245 
0.249 
0.237 
0.198 
0.244 
0.247 
0.249 
0.244 
Change in 
Dispersion 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Divergence 
Convergence 
Divergenceb 
Divergenceb 
Convergence 
Divergencea 
Divergence 
Convergence 
Divergence 
Convergence 
Divergencea 
Convergence 
Table 9. 
( Continued) 
Variable Description 
Meets Abilities Important 
to Job (l=yes, 2=no) 
Efficient Worker Paid 
More (l=Fair, 2=Unfair) 
How Business Managed? 
(l=By Owners, 2=By Owners 
& Employees, 3=By 
Government, 4=Employees 
Own) 
Follow Instructions? 
(l=Should, 2=Depends, 
3=Must be Convinced 
First) 
Less Emphasis on Money 
(l=Good, 2=Don't Mind, 
3=Bad) 
Decrease in Importance of 
Work (l=Good, 2=Don't 
Mind, 3=Bad) 
Technological Development 
.(l=Good, 2=Don't Mind, 
3=Bad) 
Development of the 
Individual (l=Good, 
2=Don't Mind, 3=Bad) 
Simple, Natural Lifestyle 
(l=Good, 2=Don't Mind, 
3=Bad) 
Scientific Advances 
(l=Will Hurt, 2=Some of 
Each. 3=Will Help/ 
Mean 1981 
1. 477 
n=32003 
1.324 
n=29132 
1.828 
n=26228 
2.008 
n=30650 
1.573 
n=31228 
2.266 
n=31361 
1.543 
n=30985 
1.226 
n=31287 
1. 236 
n=31482 
1.772 
n=30042 
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Mean 1990 
1.453*** 
n=28941 
1.228*** 
n=25382 
1.817 
n=26229 
1.971*** 
n=26358 
1.562 
n=28442 
2.299*** 
n=28195 
1.504*** 
n=28202 
1.187*** 
n=28495 
1.221*** 
n=28599 
1.718*** 
n=26699 
Variance 
1981 
0.249 
0.219 
0.850 
0.755 
0.605 
o. 719 
0.561 
0.269 
0 .296 
0.573 
Variance 
1990 
0.248 
0.176 
0.801 
0. 771 
0.616 
0.769 
0.551 
0.234 
0.274 
0.537 
Change in 
Dispersion 
Convergence 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Divergencea 
Divergence 
Divergenceb 
Convergence . 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
** denotes t-test for difference of means significant at .05 level or greater. 
*** denotes t-test for difference of means significant at .01 level or greater. 
a denotes F-test for difference of variance significant at .05 level or greater. 
b denotes F-test for difference of variance significant at .01 level or greater. 
The individual-level results for Marriage and Family-
related values also show a general trend to consider 
faithfulness, mutual respect, understanding, being away from 
in-laws, a happy sex life, and children as very important to a 
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successful marriage. In addition, adequate income, good 
housing, sharing of household chores and common interests are 
considered rather important while having the same background, 
religion, or political views are not considered important to a 
successful marriage. Of these values, having an adequate 
income, shared backgrounds, or common religious and political 
views became less important from 1981 to 1990. Each of the 
other values became more important over this same period. 
Likewise, the value of a home in which both parents live is 
considered more important in order for children to grow up 
happily. Thus, most do not approve of single women having 
children. They also display an increasing expectation that 
parents sacrifice their own well-being if necessary to benefit 
their children. In return, children are always expected to 
respect their parents regardless of their faults or qualities. 
In each of the other variables, the movement was the same 
as displayed in the aggregate-level analysis. That is, 
marriage is less likely to be considered an outdated 
institution, but having an affair or getting a divorce are 
considered more acceptable behavior. Further, two or three 
children are considered ideal and these children are expected 
to respect their parents regardless of individual qualities or 
faults. Table 10 displays these findings. 
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Table 10. Individual-level Results for Marriage and Family 
Variables. 
Variable Description 
Faithfulness Important to 
Marriage (l=very, 
2=rather, 3=not very) 
Adequate Income Important 
to Marriage (l=very, 
2=rather, 3=not very) 
Same Background Important 
to Marriage (l=very, 
2=rather, 3=not very) 
Mutual Respect Important 
to Marriage (l=very, 
2=rather, 3=not very) 
Religion Important to 
Marriage (l=very, 
2=rather, 3=not very) 
Good Housing Important to 
Marriage (l=very, 
2=rather, 3=not very) 
Politics Important to 
Marriage (l=very, 
2=rather, 3=not very) 
Understanding Important 
to Marriage (l=very, 
2=rather, 3=not very) 
Away From In-Laws 
Important to Marriage 
(l=very, 2=rather, 3=not 
very) 
Happy Sex Life Important 
to Marriage (l=very, 
2=rather, 3=not very) 
Share Household Chores 
Important to Marriage 
(l=very, 2=rather, 3=not 
very) 
Children Important to 
Marriage (l=very, 
2=rather, 3=not very) 
Commo11 Interests 
Important to Marriage 
(l=very, 2=rather, 3=not 
very) 
Ideal Size of Family 
(actual number of 
children) 
Children Need Both 
Parents in Home (l=Agree, 
2=Disagree) 
Mean 1981 
1.210 
n=30731 
1.719 
n=30681 
2 .171 
n=30511 
1.190 
n=30655 
2.168 
n=30459 
1.757 
n=30582 
2.501 
n=30443 
1.233 
n=30601 
1.855 
n=30411 
1.419 
n=30415 
1. 999 
n=30429 
1.556 
n=30506 
1. 677 
n=30429 
2.914 
n=30802 
Mean 1990 
1.188*** 
n=27112 
1.738*** 
n=27096 
2.218*** 
n=26985 
1.152*** 
n=27081 
2.213*** 
n=26931 
1. 783*** 
n=27059 
2.564*** 
n=26916 
1.212*** 
n=27064 
1.826*** 
n=26874 
1.408** 
n=26987 
1.850*** 
n=26972 
1.484*** 
n=26980 
2.623*** 
n=26818 
1.121*** 
n=27971 
Variance 
1981 
0.221 
0.445 
0.590 
0.189 
0.666 
0.460 
0.480 
0.222 
0. 691 
0.354 
0.612 
0.507 
0.460 
2.897 
0.148 
Variance 
1990 
0.193 
0.428 
0.567 
0.149 
0.643 
0.420 
0.420 
0 .196 
0.672 
0.324 
0.551 
0.460 
0.436 
1.254 
0.106 
Change in 
Dispersion 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Convergencea 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Table 10. 
(Continued) 
Variable Description 
Marriage Outdated 
Institution (1-Yes, 2=No) 
Woman as Single Parent 
(l=Approve, 2=Depends, 
3=Disapprove) 
Children Respect Parents 
(l=Regardless of 
Qualities or Faults, 
2=Must be Earned by 
Parents) 
Parents' Responsibilities 
(l=Sacrifice for child's 
well-being, 2=Neither, 
3=Parents have own life) 
More Emphasis on Fqmily 
Life (l=Good thing, 
2=Both, 3=Bad) 
Married Man/Woman Have 
Affair (l=Never 
justified, 2-9= depends, 
l0=Always justified) 
Mean 1981 
1.818 
n=29537 
2.023 
n=30526 
1.314 
n=29076 
1.588 
n=29858 
1.158 
n=31544 
2. 596 
n=30789 
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Mean 1990 
1.853*** 
n=26465 
2.020 
n=27877 
1.286*** 
n=26624 
1.505*** 
n=27858 
1.122*** 
n=28683 
2.729*** 
n=28807 
Variance 
1981 
0.149 
0.740 
0 .215 
0.726 
0 .196 
5.198 
Variance 
1990 
0.125 
0.757 
0.204 
0.635 
0.152 
5.631 
Change in 
Dispersion 
Convergenceb 
Divergencea 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Divergenceb 
4.834 5.337*** 8.128 Divorce (l=Never 8. 283 Divergence 
n=30720 n=27942 justified, 2-9= depends, lO-Alwavs fo8tified) 
** denotes t-test for difference of means significant at .05 level or greater. 
*** denotes t-test for difference of means significant at .01 level or greater. 
a denotes F-test for difference of variance significant at .05 level or greater. 
b denotes F-test for difference of variance significant at .01 level or greater. 
What is most striking about the individual-level analysis 
of Marriage and Family-related values is that in nineteen of 
the twenty-two variables, values became more similar from 1981 
to 1990. The only values that became more diverse were 
whether it is appropriate for a woman to be a single parent, 
whether it is justifiable for married individuals to have an 
affair, and whether divorce is acceptable. For these 
variables, the conflict between autonomy or individual choice 
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and family or collective-based values seems to divide many 
individuals and create more diversity in beliefs. However, as 
shown in Table 10 above, for the nineteen other variables, the 
consensus in beliefs appears stronger in 1990 compared to 
1981. 
Those values relating to Politics and Government show an 
increased emphasis placed on freedom and individualism. A 
decline in the value placed on authority and increases in the 
acceptability of various methods of public dissent showed the 
importance placed on individual autonomy. As in the aggregate 
analysis, most individuals place themselves slightly left of 
middle on the political spectrum; and although more willing to 
fight for their country, they are also more tolerant of 
fighting with the police or threatening workers who do not 
join a strike. Moreover, it also seems it is more acceptable 
to cheat on one's taxes or claim governmental benefits even if 
one is not entitled to these benefits. Finally, political 
assassinations became slightly more acceptable from 1981 to 
1990. However, fully 75 percent of individuals still consider 
such assassinations unacceptable compared to 82 percent in 
1981. 
For these ten Government and Politics-related variables, 
six showed divergence while three converged from 1981 to 1990. 
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Self-placement on the political spectrum converged over this 
period with more individuals placing their beliefs near the 
center of the spectrum. Individuals also became more similar 
in their belief that reform is the most appropriate method of 
political change. However, more individuals agreed to fight 
for their country if necessary. The values described by the 
other seven variables showed the same level of or less 
consensus in 1990 than in 1981. The individuals in this sample 
were less likely to agree whether freedom or equality are more 
important values, whether more. respect for authority would be 
good or bad, and whether claiming undeserved government 
benefits, cheating on taxes, fighting with the police, 
threatening workers who refuse to join a strike, or political 
assassinations are acceptable means of behavior. It seems 
individual behavior is considered more relative to certain 
circumstances which is consistent with our expectation that a 
consensus on the value of the individual will result in 
diverse values regarding the political system. Table 11 
displays the results of the individual level responses 
relating to political and government values. 
The final group of variables in this analysis are related 
to Morality, Religion, and Sexuality. As in the aggregate 
analysis, we see a general increase in individual choice, but 
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Table 11. Individual-level Results for Politics and Government 
Variables. 
Variable Description 
Which More Important? 
(l=Freedom, 2=Depends, 
3=Equality) 
Self-Placement on 
Ideological Spectrum 
(l=Left, lO=Right) 
Feelings Toward Society 
(l=Must Be Radically 
Changed, 2=Reformed, 
3=Defended Against 
Subversive Forces 
Willing to Fight for 
Country? (l=Yes, 2=No) 
Greater Respect for 
Authority in Future 
(l=Good, 2=Don't Mind, 
3=Bad) 
Claiming Benefits Not 
Entitled To (l=Never 
Justified, 2-9=Depends, 
lO=Always Justified) 
Cheating on Taxes 
(l=Never Justified, 2-
9=Depends, lO=Always 
Justified) 
Fighting with Police 
(l=Never Justified, 2-
9=Depends, lO=Always 
Justified) 
Threatening Workers 
Refusing to Join Strike 
(l=Never Justified, 2-
9=Depends, lO=Always 
Justified) 
Political Assassinations 
(l=Never Justified, 2-
9=Depends, lO=Always 
Mean 1981 
1.835 
n=29494 
5.621 
n=24023 
2.183 
n=25747 
1.395 
n=26171 
1.672 
n=31156 
2.0ll 
n=30932 
2.484 
n=29753 
2.219 
n=29448 
1. 785 
n=29527 
1.582 
n=30662 
Mean 1990 
1.793*** 
n=26705 
5.370*** 
n=23099 
2.113*** 
n=25694 
1.362*** 
n=23026 
1.724*** 
n=28367 
2.363*** 
n=28242 
2.626*** 
n=28463 
2.665*** 
n=28132 
1.862*** 
n=28150 
1.819*** 
n=27969 
Variance 
1981 
0.880 
4.377 
0.267 
0.239 
0.686 
3.940 
5.541 
4.166 
2.989 
2.487 
Variance 
1990 
0.893 
4.032 
0.222 
0.231 
0.707 
5.217 
5.949 
5.208 
3.404 
3.404 
Change in 
Dispersion 
Divergence 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Convergenceb 
Divergenceb 
Divergenceb 
Divergenceb 
Divergenceb 
Divergenceb 
Divergenceb 
** denotes t-test for difference of means significant at .os·1evel or greater. 
*** denotes t-test for difference of means significant at .01 level or greater. 
a denotes F-test for difference of variance significant at .05 level or greater. 
b denotes F-test for difference of variance significant at .01 level or greater. 
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handicapped, but not acceptable if the mother is unmarried or 
if the parerits do not want an additional child. Also, 
individual choice is more highly valued in such issues as 
prostitution, homosexuality, euthanasia, suicide, and sex 
between individuals under the legal age of consent. The move 
to greater tolerance of these types of behavior may be 
embraced or considered enlightened by those concerned with 
civil rights or liberties. However, this general tolerance of 
individual choice also seems to apply to values less likely to 
be embraced by such advocates. These values are those 
regarding general honesty or morality such as avoiding the 
fare on pµblic transportation, buying stolen goods, joyriding, 
using marijuana, keeping money that is found, lying in one's 
own interest, and not reporting hitting a parked car. Each of 
these activities are considered somewhat more justifiable by 
the respondents of this survey. Table 12 details these 
changes as well as for the other variables relating to 
morality, religion, and sexuality. 
In accordance to my initial hypotheses, fifteen of the 
twenty variables in this category showed evidence of 
divergence. Thus, it appears that as individualism is embraced 
as a value, some activities or behavior that would normally be 
considered unacceptable become less so. In sum, when 
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Table 12. Individual-level Results for Morality, Religion, and 
Sexuality Variables. 
Variable Description 
Good & Evil (l=Absolute 
Guidelines, 2=Neither, 
3=Circumstances Dictate) 
What is God? (l=Personal, 
2=Spirit or Life Force, 
3=Unsure, 4=No God) 
Abortion OK: Mother's 
Health (l=Yes, 2=No) 
Abortion OK: Handicapped 
Child (l=Yes, -2=No) 
Abortion OK: Mother 
Unmarried (l=Yes, 2=No) 
Abortion OK: No Want 
Child (l=Yes, 2=No) 
Avoid Transport Fare 
(l=Never Justified, 2-
9=Depends, l0=Never 
Justified) 
Buying Stolen Goods 
(l=Never Justified, 2-
9=Depends, l0=Never 
Justified) 
Joyriding (l=Never 
Justified, 2-9=Depends, 
l0=Never Justified) 
Using Marijuana (l=Never 
Justified, 2-9=Depends, 
l0=Never Justified) 
Keeping Money Found 
(l=Never Justified, 2-
9=Depends, l0=Never 
Justified) 
Lying in Own Interest 
(l=Never Justified, 2-
9=Depends, l0=Never 
Justified) 
Sex Under Legal Age of 
Consent (l=Never 
Justified, 2-9=Depends, 
l0=Never Justified) 
Accepting Bribes (l=Never 
Justified, 2-9=Depends, 
l0=Never Justified) 
Homosexuality (l=Never 
Justified, 2-9=Depends, 
l0=Never Justified) 
Mean 1981 
2.393 
n=29645 
2.020 
n=29650 
1.099 
n=30945 
1.220 
n=29638 
1.695 
n=29120 
1.625 
n=29448 
2.097 
n=31186 
1.685 
n=31237 
1. 378 
n=31230 
1.658 
n=31126 
2.952 
n=31083 
2.686 
n=31094 
2 .496 
n=30813 
1. 810 
n=30994 
2.998 
n=30173 
Mean 1990 
2.304*** 
n=27338 
1.983*** 
n=25787 
1.101 
n=28397 
l.i70*** 
n=27449 
1.694 
n=27216 
1.651*** 
n=27470 
2.317*** 
n=26874 
1.878*** 
n=28595 
1.447*** 
n=26957 
1.737*** 
n=28605 
3.435*** 
n=26676 
2.936*** 
n=28382 
2.718*** 
n=28087 
1. 783 
n=28456 
3.690*** 
n=27414 
Variance Variance 
1981 1990 
0.778 0.843 
0.939 0.960 
0.089 0.091 
0.171 0.197 
0.212 0.213 
0.234 0.228 
4 .113 4.644 
2.605 3.497 
1.513 1. 918 
2. 962 3 .471 
7.017 7. 969 
5.027 5.570 
5.789 6.656 
2.856 2.876 
7.767 9.647 
Change in 
Dispersion 
Divergenceb 
Divergencea 
Divergencea 
Divergenceb 
Divergence 
Divergenceb 
Divergenceb 
Divergenceb 
Divergenceb 
Divergenceb 
Divergenceb 
Divergenceb 
Divergenceb 
Divergence 
Divergenceb 
Table 12. 
(Continued) 
Variable Description 
Prostitution(l=Never 
Justified, 2-9=Depends, 
lO=Never Justified) 
Euthanasia (l=Never 
Justified, 2-9=Depends, 
lO=Never Justified) 
Suicide (l=Never 
Justified, 2-9=Depends, 
lO=Never Justified) 
Not Reporting Hitting 
Parked Car (l=Never 
Justified, 2-9=Depends, 
lO=Never Justified) 
Killing in Self-Defense 
(l=Never Justified, 2-
9=Depends, lO=Never 
Mean 1981 
2.667 
n=30682 
3.899 
n=30231 
2.477 
n=30447 
2.046 
n=30981 
5.083 
n=30450 
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Mean 1990 
2.910*** 
n=28012 
4.476*** 
n=27145 
2.857*** 
n=27501 
2.130*** 
n=26738 
5.378*** 
n=27538 
Variance 
1981 
6.012 
9.548 
5.406 
4.012 
10.765 
v'ariance 
1990 
6. 719 
9.474 
6.482 
3.952 
10.426 
Change in 
Dispersion 
Divergenceb 
Convergence 
Divergenceb 
Convergence 
Convergenceb 
** denotes t-test for difference of means significant at .05 level or greater. 
*** denotes t-test for difference of means significant at .01 level or greater. 
a denotes F-test for difference of variance significant at .05 level or greater. 
b denotes F-test for difference of variance significant at .01 level or greater. 
individualism is accepted as a core value, the diversity of 
values relating to other issues becomes more significant as 
morality is judged through relative definitions of individual 
circumstances rather than through absolute guidelines for 
action. Table 12 displays the results of such a phenomena for 
the twenty variables relating to morals, religion, and 
sexuality. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The above results produce several important implications 
for the study of global value change and globalization. First, 
the value of aggregate and individual level analysis cannot be 
overlooked. Each type of analysis provides additional depth in 
understanding that would be lost if only one method of 
analysis were employed. Second, the relative stability of many 
of the values analyzed here in both their substantive meaning 
as well as in their relative diversity of beliefs is important 
to recognize as we discuss a global culture and increasing 
interdependence among the nations of the world. Moreover, a 
discussion of the various types of convergence or divergence 
may prove insightful as we seek to discover thresholds of 
global values and areas where absolute differences still 
exist. Third, the study of global value change has important 
implications for the future of global economic, political, and 
social interactions as nations search for public policies that 
are acceptable, globally, yet still promote free and fair 
trade among nations. Also, the study of global values can help 
predict those issues and types of behavior that will produce 
the most conflict with regard to public policy, and those 
issues that are likely to meet with less opposition. Finally, 
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further research is necessary to examine the relationships 
between modernization, globalization, and value change. 
Moreover, more research is necessary to distinguish between 
period effects and long-term trends. The following sections 
discuss these concerns more fully. 
Differences in Aggregate and Individual-Level Results 
The above results showed markedly different trends of 
global value change depending on the level of analysis. The 
results of the aggregate-level analysis found statistically 
significant evidence of convergence or divergence in only nine 
of the seventy-six variables. Of these, four variables 
displayed divergence while five displayed convergence. 
However, these results are only slightly greater than we would 
expect to occur by chance. The small sample sizes (at most, 
twenty nations) made it unlikely that differences in diversity 
would achieve statistical significance. Thus, the main 
conclusion from the aggregate-level analysis is that these 
nations maintained their level of diversity in values from 
1981 to 1990. 
Due to much larger sample sizes (ranging from 23,099 to 
32,003 cases), the individual-level analysis showed 
statistically significant changes in diversity for 76 percent 
of the variables. Of these significant changes in diversity, 
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thirty variables showed convergence and twenty-nine showed 
divergence. However, when including those variables that 
showed no significant change in diversity, the general trend 
of movement at the individual-level is toward convergence, 
with thirty-nine variables displaying some movement toward 
greater similarity and thirty-seven displaying some movement 
of increasing diversity. 
The implication of the above differences in the results 
of the different levels of analysis is that if only the 
aggregate level of analysis had been employed, we would have 
likely concluded that nations are generally maintaining 
diversity and may be moving toward increasing diversity in 
response to globalization. However, we would be wrong to say 
that individuals are becoming more diverse in their values. 
The results from the individual-level analysis show that there 
is no overall trend in the diversity among individuals, but 
that they are becoming more similar in marriage and family 
related values, more diverse on political and morality based 
values, and more similar on some economic related values and 
more dissimilar on others. Through the examination of the 
individual-level results we increase the depth of our 
understanding of global value change. In fact, we find that 
simply stratifying individuals by nation will have a 
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significant impact on our interpretation of global value 
change. In addition, it becomes clear that both levels of 
analysis provide additional depth in understanding global 
value changes. The additional depth that is available through 
the aggregate-level analysis is discussed in the following 
section. 
Patterns of Convergence and Divergence 
One important benefit of the aggregate-level analysis is 
in its structural compatibility with graphical presentation. 
As was discussed earlier, value change may occur in several 
different patterns. Convergence or divergence may be simple, 
occur from different directions, display thresholds rather 
than absolute differences, or exhibit parallel changes. By 
stratifying respondents by nation, we are able to explore such 
differences with additional depth. The individual-level 
analysis provides two points of reference: the mean value for 
1981 and the mean value for 1990. By separating respondents by 
nation, we increase the points of reference tenfold. Thus, 
what we lose in the ability to describe individual differences 
in values and the level of diversity within national 
boundaries, we gain in level of understanding of which type of 
value change is occ"l1:rring. 
To illustrate this benefit of the aggregate-level 
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analysis, I picked four variables from the aggregate-level 
analysis that showed either significant differences in the 
mean value from 1981 to 1990, the variance from 1981 to 1990, 
or both. The selection of these variables is relevant to the 
conclusions drawn from this study. That is, at least some of 
the values examined in this study displayed the type of 
changes illustrated by these graphical presentations. The 
variables chosen include whether it is fair to pay a more 
efficient worker more than another worker in the same 
occupation, whether claiming governmental benefits to which 
one is not entitled is justified, the ideal number of 
children, and whether agreeing on politics is important to a 
successful marriage. Figure 5 illustrates the observed changes 
for variables that displayed parallel change. That is, those 
variables that showed significantly different means from 1981 
to 1990, but showed no significant difference in the level of 
diversity among nations. For example, the mean value for 
whether it is fair to pay a more efficient worker more than 
another decreases from 1.338 in 1981 to 1.245 in 1990. This is 
an increase in the proportion of individuals in each country 
who believe such a pay discrepancy is fair. However, the 
variance among nations was 0.008 in 1981 and 0.009 in 1990, 
which shows very little difference in the range of values 
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Figure S. Parallel Change in Values Toward Efficiency. 
cross-nationally from 1981 to 1990. As shown in Figure 5, it 
quickly beComes apparent which nations do not move along the 
general trend. In this case, three nations appear as 
exceptions to the general movement of value change. Of these, 
only Japan moved opposite the general trend and showed a 
marked increase in its mean value from 1981 to 1990. The mean 
value for Norway was nearly identical in 1981 and 1990 (1.44 
and 1.46) and the mean value for Sweden actually moved in the 
same direction as the other nations, but without a large shift 
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in average value. Thus, the graphical presentation more 
conducive to the aggregate-level analysis provides the benefit 
of exposing nations that do not fit the overall model of value 
change. 
Figure 6 shows the case in which values became more 
diverse among nations, but the average value of all nations 
combined was not significantly different from 1981 to 1990. In 
this case, claiming undeserved governmental benefits did not 
become more acceptable or less acceptable for all nations. 
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Figure 6. Divergence from Different Directions in the 
Acceptance of Claiming Undeserved Government Benefits. 
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Instead, in some nations it became more acceptable to claim 
such benefits, while in others it became less acceptable. Such 
a change is described as divergence from different directions 
since some nations are above the average value and others are 
below the average value and became more diverse over time. 
Again, this type of data presentation provides additional 
insight into the dynamics of value change. It appears that two 
nations, Mexico and Finland, became significantly more likely 
to believe claiming government benefits was acceptable even if 
one is not entitled to those benefits while most other nations 
did not change much in these values over time. Such changes in 
values suggest a more detailed analysis of the socioeconomic 
and political conditions in Mexico and Finland during the 
period from 1981 to 1990 may prove useful in identifying the 
causes of value change. In addition, France appears to be a 
unique case in that the mean value is fairly steadily above 
the mean values for the other nations. Thus, a more detailed 
look into the dynamics of French political culture may prove 
insightful. 
Figure 7 displays the change in the ideal number of 
children from 1981 to 1990. In this case, the mean value 
decreased significantly from 1981 to 1990 and the cross-
national variance also decreased over the same time. This 
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Figure 7. Simple Convergence in Values Regarding Ideal Family 
Size. 
situation is consistent with the concept of simple convergence 
in which nearly every country moved in the same direction, 
valuing fewer children as the ideal family size. Although some 
nations clearly moved f.aster than others, and some nations did 
not significantly change, the general trend is of valuing 
fewer children in making up the ideal family size. 
Finally, Figure 8 shows the case of converging from 
different directions. While the overall mean value did not 
77 
2.8 ---------------------------------- - - - - - - - - - ---··--,, -=--= 
2.6 ~~;;;;;;;;;;;;~~~~~=~~~~ 
I I I 
Q) ·-·-o 2.4 
(.) 
en 
C: ca 
a> 2.2 ----1---------.,,,,----------.,,,:.__--------
:::E // 
1.8 --+--------------
1981 1990 
Year 
Figure 8. Convergence from Different Directions in Values 
Regarding Importance of Agreement on Politics to a Successful 
Marriage. 
significantly change from 1981 to 1990, the variance in 
response decreased significantly as nations above the group 
mean showed a tendency to place increasing value in agreement 
on politics as important to a successful marriage and nations 
below the group mean tending to place less value in such 
agreement. 
Overall, the aggregate-level analysis provides greater 
depth in explanation of global value change by allowing for 
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the distinction between the various types of value change. 
Specifically, such analysis allows us to conclude that 
these nations exhibit evidence of parallel change in values 
relating to the acceptability of fighting with the police, 
homosexuality, euthanasia, suicide, and divorce, the 
importance of sharing household chores to a successful 
marriage, whether marriage is an outdated institution, the 
importance of good pay to a job, and whether efficiency is an 
acceptable method of determining pay scales. In addition, 
simple convergence is shown in values related to the ideal 
family size with regard to children and whether children need 
both parents in the home in order to grow up happily. In both 
cases, a common final destination seems agreeable cross-
nationally and each nation is moving toward that point. 
Finally, convergence or divergence from different directions 
is exhibited by those values such as self-placement on the 
political spectrum, claiming undeserved government benefits, 
joyriding, not reporting hitting a parked car, the value of 
politics and understanding to a successful marriage, the 
importance of meeting people as an aspect of a job, and the 
appropriate management of business. 
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Value Stability and Change 
However grand the above conclusions appear, an additional 
aspect of value change that can be derived from the present 
study is the relative stability of values over time. For this 
discussion, the individual-level results are most compelling. 
Despite the large sample sizes used for the individual-level 
analysis, seven of the seventy-six variables showed no 
significant difference in the mean value from 1981 to 1990. 
In fact, even in those variables with statistically 
significant differences, most were in the degree of consensus 
regarding a particular response rather than a move to a 
different response category. 
However, five variables either changed to another 
category as the most common response or the primary category 
of response lost enough respondents to make it no longer the 
most common response. One such variable asks how business 
should be managed. In 1981, the response was nearly evenly 
split between category one: "owners should run their business 
or appoint the managers," and category two: "owners and 
employees should participate in the selection of managers." 
However, in 1990 there were six percent more individuals who 
considered the latter style to be more effective, making this 
the most common response. 
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A similar switch occurred with regard to the question: 
what is God? While in 1981 there was an even split between 
considering God to be either a upersonal being" or usome sort 
of spirit or life force," in 1990, five percent more 
individuals said they considered God a personal being than 
said God was a spirit or life force. In addition, the 
importance of good housing to a successful marriage was 
considered rather important to nearly 54 percent of 
respondents in 1990 compared to 48 percent in 1981. However, 
two other values are no longer shared by a majority of 
respondents. For example, keeping money that is found is no 
longer considered 'never justified' by most individuals. 
Nearly 59 percent of individuals in 1990 considered it 
acceptable under some circumstances to keep money they found 
while only 49 percent thought so in 1981. Also, homosexuality 
is considered acceptable, at least in some circumstances, for 
nearly 55 percent of respondents in 1990 compared to only 45 
percent in 1981. Thus, these variables show a significant 
shift in substantive meaning over this period. 
Fifteen other variables changed in the degree of 
consensus and uniformity, but did not change in their 
substantive meaning. These variables are defined as those 
showing an increase or decrease of at least five percent in 
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the most common category from 1981 to 1990. Paying a more 
efficient worker more money became more acceptable from 1981 
to 1990, as did the importance of good pay or the opportunity 
to achieve something to a job. More individuals would 
consider a decrease in the emphasis of work in their lives to 
be a bad thing and consider reform the best method of changing 
society as opposed to revolutionary or reactionary tactics. A 
greater majority of individuals agreed that children need both 
parents in the home in order to grow up happily and fewer 
people considered it acceptable to have an abortion to avoid 
giving birth to a handicapped child. Perhaps most striking and 
disturbing is the fact that fewer people consider it never 
justifiable to claim government benefits they are not entitled 
to, avoid the fare on public transportation, lie in their own 
interest, or fight with the police. 
In addition, the acceptability of political 
assassinations grew significantly over this period. Is the 
increased tolerance for these activities related to the 
increased tolerance for prostitution, euthanasia, or suicide 
that is also evident from these data? Perhaps a relationship 
exists between the value placed on individualism and the 
tolerance displayed for deviance from typical behavior. 
Future research will have to address these questions in 
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greater detail. 
The fifty-six other variables examined showed no 
substantive change in values from 1981 to 1990. In part, this 
is to be expected since values are more stable than mere 
opinions such as "for whom are you likely to vote in the next 
presidential election?" But does this stability in values 
represent thresholds, in which we are likely to discover some 
real differences among individuals and nations, or end points 
that symbolize the extent to which we can expect uniformity in 
global culture? Further research is necessary to distinguish 
between the period effects examined here and the possible 
long-term implications of global value changes. 
Future Research Goals 
Thankfully, the World Values Survey group is in the 
process of completing a third stage of the current survey. 
Combined with the data here, this third survey will help in 
the evaluation of period versus long-term value changes. It 
will also be useful in identifying whether the convergence and 
divergence discovered in the present study is a long-tern 
trend or a result of period effects. Further, it will help 
identify thresholds and absolute differences among nations 
since at the very least a third time period is necessary for 
such determinations. In addition to the use of this third 
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time period, several other research goals should be employed 
in the future. 
First, a more sophisticated categorization of the 
variables is necessary. While the present separation of 
variables into broader categories of economic, family, 
political, and morality values is at least theoretically 
useful, such categorization needs to be tested to address both 
internal and external validity concerns. Perhaps an index of 
individualism would provide further insight into the phenomena 
of value change and the convergence of values. Or perhaps 
individualism should be treated as an independent variable as 
we seek for the most appropriate characteristics of 
individuals and nations with which to study. Other 
possibilities include socioeconomic status, age, ethnicity, 
and religion, etc. Are these groups of individuals becoming 
more similar or more different? Which characteristic produces 
the largest amount of variance in responses, which produces 
the most similar responses? All these questions are important 
to further understanding of global value change. 
Finally, it is important to test whether those nations or 
individuals who are most global are also most likely to hold 
similar values. The results here suggest globalization has an 
impact on value change independent of the effects of economic 
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security or well-being, but more formal tests are necessary to 
determine the extent of such an impact beyond that can be 
attributed to economic situation. 
Implications for Global Interactions 
Finally, the preceding discussion has implications for 
globalization itself. The growing economic, political, and 
social interdependence among individuals and nations will 
require nations to adopt policies and procedures that are 
acceptable globally. Free trade requires nations to work 
together on labor, environmental, and financial policies and 
the extent to which nations hold similar values will certainly 
influence such interactions. 
The present study suggests that in some issues consensus 
may be attainable, but in others conflict is surely to arise. 
Marriage and family values appear to be converging in the 
twenty nations studied suggesting universal policies relating 
to this area may be easier to achieve than those relating to 
politics or morality in which these twenty nations displayed a 
growing lack of consensus in a variety of issues. In addition, 
although it was expected that economic issues display the most 
evidence of convergence, half of the values relating to these 
values grew more diverse from 1981 to 1990. 
I suspect much of this diversity is created by an 
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embracing of individualism as a core value, but further 
research is necessary to make this connection more solidly. 
Another emphasis of future research should be to connect the 
holding of certain values to subsequent behavior and more 
specifically, to the creation of public policy. Are those 
nations that display more tolerance in their value 
orientations also more likely to enqct policies congruent to 
such beliefs? In other words, how do values become behavior? 
Additionally, to what extent do the least global nations hold 
similar values? Does globalization (along with modernization) 
leave some nations and individuals out of the picture? To what 
extent does this gap between the global and those who are 
isolated affect values and behavior? The future research 
possibilities are bright and diverse only to be surpassed by 
the imJ?ortance of their results. 
Conclusion 
This paper is the culmination of an initial exploration 
into the dynamics of value change at the global level. 
Globalization appears to have an impact that is beyond that of 
modernization or economic determinism. Specifically, in the 
current globalized world, values relating to marriage and 
family relationships are converging while values relating to 
politics and morality are becoming increasingly diverse. 
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Moreover, a global cultural system that appears to have 
embraced individualism as a core value, produces somewhat 
different values about the important aspects of a job or what 
type of lifestyle is most valuable. In addition, although 
convergence is the most common trend in individual values, 
grouping individuals by nation reverses the trend to one of 
divergence in values. Clearly, globalization does not have an 
equal impact on everyone and the nation of residence plays an 
important. role in these unequal effects. 
In sum, this thesis was designed to give an introduction 
into the study of convergence and divergence in values as well 
as to provide a model for exploring such questions in the 
future. In this quest, I hope I have provided some interesting 
possibilities for the future students of society and its 
values. 
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